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The current Russo-Chechen conflict illustrates the
persistent tension between the principles of national self-
determination and territorial integrity. Russia and
Chechnya remain engaged in a centuries-old struggle with no
foreseeable end. Many Chechens assert that they are
continuing the struggle to break free of Russian oppression
which began over two centuries ago. Indeed, Chechens have
compared their struggle for national self-determination to
that of the United States in 1776. In contrast, Russians
argue that they have the right to protect and preserve
their country’s territorial integrity. In an effort to gain
support from foreign observers, Russia has portrayed its
struggle in Chechnya as part of the fight against
international terrorism. Reaching an acceptable political
solution would require compromises regarding the
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I. INTRODUCTION
This thesis examines Chechnya’s campaign for
independence from Russian rule and Russia’s efforts to
defeat this campaign. In presenting their case to foreign
audiences, Russian leaders have defended their action in
Chechnya as a fight against “a common foe, the common foe
being international terrorism.”1 In contrast, spokesmen for
Chechnya have maintained that it is engaged in a struggle
for national independence. This thesis explores the
conflict in Chechnya from both perspectives in an attempt
to clarify the complex nature of the conflict and to reach
informed judgments as to the main factors that may
determine its outcome.
The Russians have presented their operations in
Chechnya as a legitimate struggle against international
terrorism. The Putin government, in an attempt to gain the
support of the West for its campaign in Chechnya, has
sought to “portray its actions as little different from
Western anti-terrorist operations.”2 This thesis examines
the historical background of Russia’s experiences with
terrorism, from the end of the nineteenth century to the
present, and clarifies why Russians have chosen to present
their actions in Chechnya as a response to terrorism. 
From the perspective of many Chechens, they are
engaged in a legitimate struggle for independence from
                    
1 Russian President Vladimir Putin quoted in Washington Post
(Washington), 13 September 2001. Available Online at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A21535-
2001Sep12?language=printer
2 Gail W. Lapidus, “Putin’s War on Terrorism: Lessons From Chechnya,”
Post Soviet Affairs 18 (January-March 2002): 44.
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Russian rule. This thesis explores Chechnya’s struggle for
independence beginning with the first Russian attempts to
conquer Chechen lands in the late eighteenth century. “For
the entire period from 1785 to the present in the Eastern
Caucasus has been essentially one long struggle by the
Chechens against Russian domination, interspersed with
unstable truces and periods of sullen and unwilling
submission.”3 While the Russian government has frequently
presented its interpretation of the conflict, it is
important to gain a better understanding of Chechen
perspectives.
Finally, this thesis provides an analysis of prospects
for Chechen independence and other possible outcomes that
might lead to a resolution of the conflict. For the
Chechens to gain independence they would require
significant support from foreign governments, an erosion
(or collapse) of prevailing foreign perceptions of the
legitimacy of Russian rule, the development of their own
military power and political cohesion, and/or the
exhaustion of the Russian state’s colonizing power or a
loss of public support in Russia for continuing repressive
measures. From Moscow’s perspective, Chechen independence
and Russian interests in the region (including security and
economic interests) are at odds.
Russia’s attempts to impose military solutions to its
problems in Chechnya appear to be failing in that a
significant number of Chechens have remained defiant and
have continued their efforts to attain national
                    
3 Anatol Lieven, Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1998), 304.  

  3
independence. The antagonists base their policies on
conflicting international principles, territorial integrity
in the case of the Russians, and self-determination in the
case of the Chechens. The challenges involved in resolving
the conflict are clearly complex. An analysis of the
conflict from the perspectives of both the Russians and the
Chechens may contribute to an understanding of the
conflict’s dynamics and potential outcome. 
This thesis is based on primary sources such as
statements by Russian and Chechen officials, and on
secondary sources such as journalist accounts of the
conflict and scholarly studies. It provides a qualitative
analysis based on a review of the historical development of
these issues. This thesis is organized as follows:
Chapter II examines Russian experiences with terrorism
from the end of the nineteenth century to the present. This
review is intended to clarify why Russia has called all
Chechen efforts to achieve national self-determination
“terrorism,” whether the acts in question involve non-
violent political demonstrations, conventional military
operations, or actions that meet generally accepted
definitions of “terrorism,” such as the hostage-taking in a
Moscow theater in October 2002.
Chapter III explores the Chechen campaign for self-
determination. The review includes the origins of Russian
rule, the behavior of the Soviet government toward the
Chechens, and current Chechen perspectives in an attempt to
gain a better understanding of why the Chechens continue to
resist Moscow’s rule and struggle for independence despite
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the brutal repression of their efforts by the Russian
government.
Chapter IV offers an analysis of prospects for Chechen
independence. It reviews issues preventing reconciliation
and conflict-termination. It includes an assessment of the
conditions required for Chechnya to gain independence. It
also discusses the concepts of territorial integrity and
self-determination as they apply to the Russo-Chechen
conflict.
Chapter V summarizes conclusions and discusses the
future of the Russo-Chechen conflict and the prospects for
a political solution. If full national independence cannot
be obtained, the Chechens may choose to accept a less
ambitious form of self-determination, at least on a
temporary and provisional basis.
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II. RUSSIA’S CAMPAIGN AGAINST CHECHEN INDEPENDENCE
In the ongoing campaign to prevent Chechen
independence Russia has thus far been able to block
effective Chechen secession, but it has been unable to
fully suppress the Chechen resistance movement. Throughout
the conflict, Russia has, at times, been chastised by
foreign governments, including the United States, for the
methods it has used to suppress the Chechen independence
movement. Foreign governments and observers have accused
Moscow of human rights violations. In May 2002 United
States Secretary of State Colin Powell said in testimony
before Congress, “We have not forgotten about Russian
abuses of human rights. We raise Chechnya at every
opportunity.”4 In presenting their case to foreign
audiences, Russian leaders have defended their action in
Chechnya as a fight against international terrorism. 
This chapter examines Russian experiences with
terrorism from the end of the nineteenth century to the
present. This review is intended to clarify why Russia has
chosen to call all Chechen efforts to achieve national
self-determination “terrorism,” whether the acts in
question involve non-violent political demonstrations,
conventional military operations, or actions that meet
generally accepted definitions of “terrorism.” 


                    
4 United States Secretary of State, Colin Powell quoted in Steven
Pifer, Statement before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in
Europe entitled U.S. Policy on Chechnya (Washington, 9 May 2002),




Terrorism in Russia is not a new phenomenon. Russians
have struggled with terrorism and its definition since at
least the late nineteenth century. In November 1917 the
Bolsheviks used tactics including terrorism to overthrow
the democratic Provisional Government that had taken power
after the abdication of Tsar Nicholas II. Revolution
(including terrorism) was at the heart of the Marxist-
Leninist ideology to which the Soviet Union’s leaders
professed allegiance.
After the Soviet Union fell, Russia began to embrace
Western definitions of terrorism. This included discounting
armed struggle and revolution as justifications for
terrorism. The mid-1990s brought Russia increased levels of
terrorism, mostly resulting from the conflict in Chechnya.
This conflict intensified owing to various factors,
including the brutality of Russian tactics and the
contributions of militant Muslim factions abroad. As the
Russian campaign in Chechnya became more brutal, the
Chechen fighters lost ground. In an attempt to halt, or at
least delay, Russia’s military momentum, the Chechens
shifted their tactics. Anatol Lieven, who covered the war
as a journalist, gives this account:
When I visited Serzhen Yurt and Vedeno (along
with Sebastion Smith of AFP) in that month [May
1995], we saw considerable evidence that Chechen
fortunes were at a low ebb, probably their lowest
ebb of the entire war. Ammunition was very short,
many of the men were extremely tired and in some
cases moral had begun to crack. Basayev admitted
later that the Chechens had been close to defeat,
and said that as a result he had had unwillingly
to adopt the tactic of raids into Russia and the
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taking of civilian hostages.5  
Faced with rising levels of terrorism, Russia has made
many attempts to stem the tide of terror, and it has
experienced both success and at times drastic failure.
1. Terrorism Defined
Terrorism is typically employed by the “underdog”
based on the view that it is his weapon of last resort
and/or that it offers the greatest promise of results in
the given circumstances. Some modern terrorists apparently
believe that they have no choice but to employ this
strategy in order to defeat the superior forces they face.
These forces may consist of a military force, the state, or
an international order that is not to their satisfaction
(e.g., the opposition of al-Qaeda terrorists to the secular
and democratic societies of the West). Viewed in this way,
terrorism has been and will continue to be rationalized by
terrorists as an appropriate response to superior force.6
Terrorism has been an effective tool for the weak
because it allows them to maximize their limited resources
by seeking to intimidate and test the determination of a
much stronger adversary.7 The success of terrorism can
generally be attributed, not only to the fear generated by
the threat or act of violence, but also to the heavy
emphasis placed on the use of violence as a form of
psychological warfare. As Michael McEwen notes,
                    
5 Anatol Lieven, Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1998), 123.
6 Stephen Sloan, “Terrorism and Asymmetry,” in Lioyd J. Matthews,
ed., Challenging the United States Symmetrically and Asymmetrically:
Can America be Defeated? (Carlisle Barracks, Penn: U.S. Army War
College Strategic Studies Institute, 1998), 175.
7 Ibid., 177.
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Terrorism is a form of psychological operations
(PSYOP)... Many other characteristics of
terrorism are argued by the drafters of competing
definitions, but virtually all include words to
the effect that acts of terrorism are directed at
a target audience and not just the immediate
victim. Without this provision, terrorism would
be indistinguishable from other acts of violence.8
Owing to its psychological impact, terrorism has been
a proven form of communication for separatist groups trying
to get their message across to a particular audience.
The impact of terrorism on the psyche and its
effectiveness, at least in some circumstances, as a tool
for the weak are quite clear. What is not clear, or agreed
upon among scholars, is how to define terrorism. Terrorism
by nature is difficult to define. Acts of terrorism evoke
emotional responses in the victims (those hurt by the
violence and those affected by the fear) as well as in the
perpetrators of the violence. The number of definitions
offered is nearly endless. Even within the United States
government, agreement on a definition does not exist.9
Listed below are examples of different definitions within
the U.S. government:
• The unlawful use of force or violence against
persons or property to intimidate or coerce a
government, the civilian population, or any
segment thereof, in the furtherance of political
or social objectives (Federal Bureau of
Investigation).10

                    
8 Michael T. McEwen, “Psychological Operations Against Terrorism: The
Unused Weapon,” Military Review, January 1986.
9 David J. Whittaker, ed., The Terrorism Reader (New York: Routledge,
2001), 3.
10 As quoted in “Definitions,” The Terrorism Research Center.
Available at http://www.terrorism.com/terrorism/def.shtml
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• The calculated use of violence or the threat of
violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or
to intimidate governments or societies in the
pursuit of goals that are generally political,
religious, or ideological (Department of
Defense).11

• Premeditated, politically motivated violence
perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-
national groups or clandestine agents, usually
intended to influence an audience (State
Department).12

With so many definitions of terrorism in circulation,
the task of deciding which acts should be considered
terrorism can be difficult. Moreover, it is important to
remember that terrorism is not senseless violence (in the
terrorist’s eyes at least) against arbitrarily selected
victims. Terrorism has purposes beyond its immediate
destructive effects and instilling fear in those that
witness the attack. Whatever the purposes motivating
terrorists, they commit the acts of terrorism to achieve
specific goals (e.g., to cause general terror, to get
demands answered, and to gain attention).13
The primary goal of all terrorists is to cause terror
among the population. They gain a substantial advantage if
they can instill public fear and demoralize a society. With
                    
11 United States Army Field Manual 100-20, Stability and Support
Operations, “Chapter 8: Combating Terrorism” as excerpted in “The
Basics: Combating Terrorism,” The Terrorism Research Center. Available
at http://www.terrorism.com/terrorism/basics.shtml
12 Definition chosen by the United States State Department for its
annual report Patterns of Global Terrorism from Title 22 of the United
States Code, Section 2656f(d). Available at
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2001/html/10220.htm
13 Alex P. Schmid, Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts,
Theories, Data Bases, and Literature (Amsterdam: North-Holland
Publishing Company, 1984), 97-99. 
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the public anxious about when and where the next attack
will take place, the government is under pressure to act.
As Frank Cilluffo, Deputy Director of the Global Organized
Crime Project at the Center for Strategic International
Studies, has pointed out,
At the heart of all terrorism is the intention to
erode trust and undermine confidence in a
government, its institutions, its elected
officials, leaders, its policies in a given
region; and also to show the population—hey, you
cannot stop us—no matter what steps you take, you
cannot stop us.14
Moreover, the loss of civil liberties would mean, in
Cillufo’s view, “the terrorist wins.”15
The second possible goal of terrorists is to coerce
someone into meeting their demands. This usually requires a
hijacking or kidnapping. Terrorists use such tactics to
have a wide range of demands met, such as the release of
prisoners or associates and the extortion of money to fund
further operations and buy weapons.
The third possible goal is to gain attention. Attacks
may draw attention to a particular issue or cause that the
terrorists feel needs to be addressed. An ancillary purpose
behind this goal is to win recruits and support for the
organization. The terrorists prove to sympathizers that
their organization is strong; and they attempt to whip
their supporters into an emotional fervor in hopes of
making their organization more attractive to prospective
recruits.
                    
14 Frank Cilluffo, responding to questions posed by TV journalists at




The complexity of defining terrorism was recently
highlighted by a prominent American analyst’s proposed
definition “as the deliberate targeting of civilians, and
not his ideology or religion.”16 Pierre Hassner, a
distinguished French authority on international relations
has pointed out that “if the distinguishing criterion is
the death or suffering inflicted on the civilian
population, it should be applied to strategic bombing (as
in...Russia’s bombing of Chechnya...), and to reprisals
against towns and villages, and to most embargoes.”17
 2. Changing Attitudes During the Soviet Era
During the period prior to the 1917 Bolshevik
Revolution, the use of terrorism (as defined above) as a
means to achieve political goals, however infrequent, did
exist in Russia.18 The early Soviet attitude toward
terrorism, based on Marxist-Leninist theory, was “critical
of the individual use of terrorism.”19 During the years of
Soviet rule, terrorism as a way to achieve goals received
little or no official public support from the Soviet
government, but it was tolerated to a certain degree if the
act of violence was “directed toward precisely defined
targets at a precisely defined time and possibly serving as
                    
16 Harvey Sicherman, “Finding a Foreign Policy,” Orbis, Spring 2002,
219-220. As cited in Pierre Hassner, “The United States: The Empire of
Force or the Force of Empire?,” (Paris: Institute for Security Studies,
European Union, September 2002), 40.
17 Hassner, 41.
18 Anna Geifman, Thou Shalt Kill: Revolutionary Terrorism in Russia,
1894-1917 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 3.
19 Walter Laqueur, foreword to Gorbachev’s “New Thinking” on
Terrorism, by Galia Golan (New York: Praeger Publishers), vii.
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a trigger for, or accompanying, the general armed
uprising.”20
As Russia entered the twentieth century, terrorism was
a common occurrence. “Marx, Engels, and Lenin did not
“reject terrorism as a matter of moral principle; in
certain conditions they thought it might work.”21 However,
the Bolsheviks held that individual terrorism had no place
in revolution because they intended to lead revolutions
ostensibly carried out by the masses. By the standards
stated above, the actions conducted during the Bolshevik
revolution (including kidnapping, sabotage, and
assassinations), committed with the purpose of creating
general chaos within the democratically oriented
Provisional Government regime with the intent of toppling
it, can be classified as terrorism. Furthermore, at
Stalin’s direction, the Soviet government took steps of
mass terrorism—for example, the “terror famine” of 1932-33
caused by Stalin and his regime to eliminate the kulaks as
a class.22 It is also worth recalling that Robert Conquest
entitled his study of Stalin’s “purges” (in fact killings)
of millions of Soviet citizens The Great Terror.23 The
general terror and fear instilled in the population through
iron-fisted tactics leave the impression that terrorism was
an instrument of state policy during the early Soviet era,
at least from Lenin through Stalin (1917-1953).
                    
20 William Pomeroy, ed., Guerrilla Warfare and Marxism (London:
Lawrence and Wishart, 1969), 75-121 as cited in Golan, 12.
21 Laqueur, vii.
22 Martin E. Malia, The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in
Russia, 1917-1991 (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 190-198.
23 Robert Conquest, The Great Terror (New York: Macmillan, 1968).
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During the Brezhnev era (1964-1982), official Soviet
policy did not allow for support of “groups using terrorism
exclusively.”24 However, the argument becomes clouded when
we attempt to distinguish between terrorism and armed
struggle. Although some experts hold that there is no firm
evidence to prove direct involvement (through control and
direction), the USSR’s policy during the Brezhnev era did
lend support to terrorism by providing arms and training to
groups known to use terrorist tactics.25
The support for terrorism by the Soviet Union was
evident when Soviet-made weapons began to show up in the
hands of organizations such as the Palestinian Liberation
Organization. As Galia Golan notes, “the Soviet Union
clearly—and in some cases openly—has provided arms to
groups that practice terrorism.”26 
The second aspect of Soviet support for terrorism was
training. The training took place in the Soviet Union,
Soviet-bloc countries, and in various other countries. The
KGB and elements of the Soviet Army’s intelligence branch
conducted the training with very little effort to cover it
up.27 Many of the groups receiving the training were
identified in the West as terrorist movements; however,
they were identified by the Soviets as revolutionaries or
anti-colonial movements.28
                    
24 Golan, 31; emphasis in the original.
25 Golan cites Western studies that provide evidence of support for
terrorism by the Soviet Union in the form of arms and training, but she
discounts the idea of “Soviet domination, control, and direction of





The Soviet government refused to reject support for a
group based solely on the methods it employed. However, the
Soviet leadership’s characterization of the methods varied
at times. “The very same methods characterized as
‘resistance’ or ‘guerrilla warfare’ during periods of
support were classified as ‘terrorism’ during periods of
nonsupport.”29 Clearly, there was Soviet state support for
terrorism (official or not) during the Brezhnev era.
Support for terrorism continued in the Soviet Union
until Mikhail Gorbachev came to power. The first signs that
attitudes were changing came in a “subtle addition to the
definition of terrorism in the 1986 edition of the Soviet
Military Dictionary...[that] added ‘new forms’ of
terrorism...that could no longer be attributed solely to
regimes or oppressors acting against oppressed
populations.”30 The new view was a shift from the former
viewpoint that justified armed struggle (including
terrorism) when it was a part of national liberation
movements. As Gorbachev said,
Crises and conflicts are also fertile ground for
international terrorism. Undeclared wars, the
export of counterrevolution in all its forms,
political assassinations, hostage taking,
aircraft hi-jackings, explosions in streets,
airports, or railway stations—this is the
loathsome face of terrorism, which those
inspiring it try to disguise with various kinds
of cynical fabrications.31 
                    
29 Ibid., 22.
30 Ibid., 33.
31 Mikhail Gorbachev, Pravda, February 26, 1986. Quoted in Galia
Golan, Gorbachev’s “New Thinking” on Terrorism (New York: Praeger,
1989), 34. 
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At this point, some Soviet leaders began to recognize
terrorism as an international problem that would require
worldwide cooperation, including Soviet cooperation with
the West. Recognition of terrorism as an international
problem became important to Russia after the dissolution of
the Soviet Union in 1991 led to the independence of fifteen
successor states, including Russia. In particular, this
recognition became important to Moscow in dealing with the
Chechen independence movement.
B. 1994-1996
During the years from 1991 to 1994, Russia was
preoccupied with political and economic instabilities and
took little action to suppress the independence movement in
Chechnya. In 1994 a series of four bus hijackings prompted
the Yeltsin government to renew its pressure on the Chechen
independence movement in an attempt to regain control of
the situation in Chechnya.32 The renewed pressure and
subsequent refusal by the Chechen leaders to capitulate led
to military intervention by Russia in December 1994.33
During the first Russo-Chechen war (1994-1996),
Chechen fighters faced an overwhelming Russian force.
Unable to oppose the Russian forces through direct
engagements the Chechens resorted to acts of terrorism in
order to regain the advantage in the war. 
The first such incident took place in a June 1995 raid
in the town of Budennovsk led by Chechen field Commander
Shamil Basayev.34 The raid, as described below by Anatol
                    
32 Lieven, 86.
33 The decision by Moscow for military intervention was much more
complex than this. For a more detailed explanation see Lieven, 84-93.
34 Ibid., 124.
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Lieven, became the turning point for Chechen tactics in the
campaign for independence:
After storming the police station and briefly
holding the town hall, they [Basayev’s forces]
rounded up several hundred hostages and confined
them in the hospital, threatening to kill them if
the Russian army did not withdraw from Chechnya.
He did in fact reportedly execute several wounded
Russian soldiers from the hospital, and some
ninety-one people were killed in the Chechen
attack, including policemen and local civilians.35
The siege ended with Basayev successfully negotiating
“an agreement involving an immediate ceasefire by Russian
troops, the reopening of negotiations, and transport and a
guarantee of safe passage for Basayev and his men to return
to separatist-held areas of Chechnya.”36
The ceasefire resulted in only a few months of
relative peace, marked by minor clashes between Russian and
Chechen forces. It ended on 9 October 1995, when Russia
announced that it was suspending the agreement.37 Russia
withdrew from the agreement after a car bomb in Grozny
critically wounded a Russian general assigned there.38 With
Russia’s withdrawal from the ceasefire and the possibility
of renewed military operations in Chechnya, Basayev
promptly countered with threats of future terrorist action
against Russian non-combatants. In an interview on 21
October 1995, Basayev said:
If war operations begin again, if the Russian
side uses force to put pressure on Chechnya, I






have said unambiguously and I repeat once again:
we do not intend to fight longer on our own
territory.... I have radioactive material. This
is a good weapon. I will spray it anywhere in the
centre of Moscow and to the glory of God I will
turn that city into an eternal desert.... If the
Russians lengthen this war, we will have to
resort to what I have been speaking of.39
In a demonstration to prove his capability to carry out
terrorism in Moscow, “Basayev’s men planted a package of
low-level radioactive cesium in a Moscow park, and then
told Russian journalists where to find it.”40
The use of terrorist tactics by Chechen separatists
continued in January 1996 after a failed attack on a
Russian military airfield outside the town of Kizlyar,
Daghestan.41 After their failure at the airport, the
separatists, led by Salman Raduyev, a relative of President
Dudayev, “entered the town and, imitating Basayev, took
some 2,000 hostages and herded them into a local
hospital.”42 On the same day, the separatists left the town
taking with them 160 hostages en route to the village of
Pervomaiskoye near the Chechen border.43 When the Chechen
separatists along with the hostages neared Pervomaiskoye,
they were attacked by Russian troops.44 “Extraordinarily,
the Chechens were able to leave the convoy and take refuge
                    
39 “Chechen Leader Basayev’s Threat to Turn Moscow Into Desert,”
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Lexis-Nexis [Online].
40 Michael Specter, “Russians Assert Radioactive Box Found in Park







in the village, adding some of its inhabitants to the
hostages.”45 Six days later, 
the Russian forces launched a full-scale attack
on Pervomaiskoye, including artillery and
helicopter gunships, and without any regard for
the safety of the hostages, between thirteen and
eighteen of whom were killed in the fighting
along with twenty-six Russian soldiers.46
Raduyev and his force managed to hold out for three days
and then escaped to Chechnya.47
Chechen President Dzhokhar Dudayev’s death in April
1996 and subsequent replacement by Vice-President Zelimkhan
Yandarbuyev ultimately led to a short peace in Chechnya and
the Khasavyurt accord in August of that year.48 Anatol
Lieven explains how this was a fortunate turn of events in
the conflict:
Hard-hearted though it may seem to say it,
Dudayev’s death did contribute to the later peace
in Chechnya. On past form, it is very difficult
to see him either being able to negotiate
successfully with Lebed in August, or allowing
Mashkadov to do so—let alone agreeing to stand in
a free election after the peace.49 
The Khasavyurt accord calling for a formal end of
hostilities between the antagonists should have brought a
decrease in terrorist attacks. Whether this was in fact the




48 The Khasavyurt is the Russian-Chechen Truce Agreement signed by
both sides on 25 August 1996. An unofficially translated english text
version is available in Diane Curran, Fiona Hill, and Elena
Kostritsyna, The Search for Peace in Chechnya: A Sourcebook 1994-1996
(Cambridge: Harvard University, March 1997), 208.
49 Lieven, 140.
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case is unclear. According to the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe, at the end of 1997 71 people
were in the custody of kidnappers.50 In the view of the
United States State Department, “Most of these involved
ransom demands, although political motives cannot be
excluded.”51 To further exacerbate the situation, in 1998
the Chechens, whom the Russians called “terrorists,” began
receiving support (equipment and training) from “Mujahidin
with extensive links to Middle Eastern and Southwest Asian
terrorists.”52 However, in 1998 the number of attacks
decreased by 60 percent and consisted mostly of kidnappings
“for financial gain” with one “politically motivated
contract killing” and a bomb explosion.53 As of 1999, the
kidnappings were unsolved and still being investigated.
However, the assassination and the bomb attack were
attributed to “domestic antagonists”—that is, fighting
among the Chechens instead of Chechen attacks on Russians.54
C. 1999 TO THE PRESENT
In 1999, the relative decrease in terrorist activity
experienced in 1998 came to an abrupt end. Russian cities,
including Moscow and Volgodonsk, suffered a series of
devastating bomb attacks that left 279 dead and over 800
                    
50 Department of State. Office of the Coordinator for
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Overview, 1. Available at
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51 Ibid.
52 Department of State. Office of the Coordinator for
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injured.55 Russian authorities blamed the attacks on Chechen
insurgents. However, no evidence was ever produced
conclusively linking the Chechens to the attacks.56 In the
wake of the apartment bombings and violence in Daghestan
that was blamed on the Chechens, the Russian military was
sent into Chechnya to eliminate the “terrorist” elements.57
Although 2000 was a comparatively quiet year for
terrorist attacks in Russia, one attack in Moscow was
blamed on Chechen rebels. On 8 August 2000, an explosion in
Moscow killed eight people and injured about 50 “during
rush hour in one of [Moscow’s] busiest subways, in Pushkin
Square.”58
In 2001, Russia experienced a large increase in
terrorist acts connected to the instability and ongoing
insurgency in Chechnya. The first incident of the year
involved the kidnapping of a United States aid worker on 9
January.59 Responsibility for the kidnapping was accepted by
Shamil Basayev, who “apologized, saying it was a
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misunderstanding,” and released the hostage on 6 February.60
On 15 March, a Russian charter flight departing Turkey for
Moscow was hijacked by “three Chechen men armed with
knives...demanding that the pilots divert the plane to an
Islamic country.”61 After landing in Saudi Arabia, the plane
was stormed by Saudi special forces who arrested two of the
hijackers and killed the third. One of the plane’s
crewmembers and a passenger also perished.62 The attacks
continued on 24 March as three car bombs killed at least 20
people in the city of Stavropol.63
The year 2002 brought Russia its deadliest incident
since the apartment bombings in 1999. In an episode
resembling the sieges in Budennovsk (1995) and Kizlyar
(1996), a group of Chechen separatists stormed a theater in
Moscow on 23 October, taking more than 700 hostages.64 Their
demands for withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya fell
on deaf ears as Ahmed Kadirov, the Russian-appointed head
of the Chechen administration, ridiculed the hostage-
takers’ actions, commenting that “one can’t resolve
problems by starting the war in another area.”65
Although the shift in tactics toward using terrorism
has given the Chechens a means to continue resisting in the
face of overwhelming Russian military forces, the use of
terrorism is generally viewed by the greater part of
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international society as unacceptable. This is especially
true in the post-11 September environment. The continued
attacks on civilians by Chechens have hurt their cause. In
particular, the Chechens’ use of terrorism has made it
easier for Russia to justify its decision to use military
force in Chechnya.
D. RUSSIAN STRATEGY IN CHECHNYA 
The Russian public diplomacy strategy in its portrayal
of the Russo-Chechen conflict has undergone a marked shift
from the first (1994-1996) to the second (1999 to the
present) phase of combat. The difference in how the
Russians have portrayed the two conflicts is at least
partially due to lessons learned from the first conflict
about public presentation policy.
Russia’s decision to intervene in Chechnya in 1994,
although prompted partially by acts of violence and
lawlessness in the region, was not portrayed as an anti-
terrorist operation. Instead, the purpose of the
intervention was for the “restoration of constitutional
legality and law and order... [and] to disarm and liquidate
military units.”66 Russia’s leaders did not institute a
public diplomacy campaign to justify their actions because
they believed that the intervention would be short and
without significant Chechen resistance. Furthermore, the
Russians were not worried about foreign perceptions because
they believed that the “international community would treat
the use of force in Chechnya as a strictly domestic Russian
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affair.”67 Their assumptions about foreign observers
remaining neutral were correct until the Chechens failed to
give in. Civilian casualties began to mount due to Russia’s
air bombardment of civilian population centers, and this
“outraged public opinion in Russia and in the West.”68
While preparing for their second violent intervention
in Chechnya, the Russians applied lessons learned from the
1994-1996 Chechen conflict. In particular, they realized
that they would face considerable resistance and that they
would need to take steps to gain public acceptance of their
decision to use force. To gain this public acceptance,
Moscow defined its reason for intervention in more specific
terms to make clear that the intervention was aimed at
terrorists rather than the entire Chechen population. In an
interview on 1 November 1999, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin
explained that the goal of Russian troops in Chechnya was
to destroy the bases of terrorists and the
conditions that could facilitate their revival.
But the most important task is to win over the
feelings of the population. It is impossible to
defeat a people, it is impossible to force a
people to its knees. As to the terrorists, they
can and must be destroyed.69
Throughout the conflict underway since 1999, the
Russian government has maintained that it is conducting an
anti-terrorist operation and protecting its territory from
being “used as a launching pad for enemies of Russian
                    
67 Carlotta Gall and Thomas de Waal, Chechnya: Calamity in the
Caucasus (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 158.
68 Lieven, 107.
69 Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin quoted in “Vladimir Putin’s
Interview to ORT Channel, November 1, 1999,” (Russian Embassy: Ottawa,
Ontario). Available at http://www.magma.ca/~rusemb/Chechnya.htm
  24
statehood and sovereignty.”70 In discussing the situation he
faces in Chechnya, President Putin told United States
President George W. Bush to “Imagine that some armed people
come from the south and want to take half of Texas. This is
exactly what we’re dealing with here.”71 Putin made these
comments to President Bush in June 2001. Three months
later, President Putin’s effort to justify the Russian
struggle in Chechnya became easier as the world watched the
terrorist attacks on the United States in horror.
The political consequences of the attacks of 11
September 2001 included a more favorable context for the
Russian cause in Chechnya. After the attacks, Washington
and other Western capitals were less inclined to criticize
Russian behavior in Chechnya. The war on terrorism since
the 11 September attacks has left Washington with little
room to criticize Russian actions in Chechnya. Even though
the Russian leaders have apparently gained support from
Washington, or at least a measure of forebearance, for
their action in Chechnya, Pierre Hassner, a prominent
French foreign policy expert, has offered this warning:
The idea that, in the fight against terrorism,
countries are recognised as either allies or
adversaries, as all are obliged to make a radical
choice, could lead to turning a blind eye to the
infringement of human rights or collective
oppression if these are justified in the name of 
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the fight against terrorism. The example of
Russia in Chechnya is particularly instructive in
this regard.72 
The 11 September attacks have led to extensive
cooperation between Moscow and Washington. President Putin
was forthcoming in support of U.S. operations by showing
little resistance to United States use of bases in Central
Asia. This action assisted the United States in mounting a
successful campaign against the Taliban and al-Qaeda
forces. The underlying implication is that the al-Qaeda
forces that attacked America have also been providing
support for the Chechen insurgents.
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III.CHECHNYA’S CAMPAIGN FOR SELF-DETERMINATION
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the Russo-
Chechen conflict from the perspective of the Chechen
people. This examination of the historical context of their
struggle for independence is important to understand the
strength of their aspirations. The Chechens’ current
campaign for self-determination is merely the latest
chapter in a struggle that began with early Russian
conquests in the eighteenth century followed by Chechen
resistance to Russian rule. Following their struggle
against Russian dominance under the Tsars, the Chechen
people endured even harsher treatment under Soviet rule.
They faced uncertainty over their region’s status as an
Autonomous Republic of the Soviet Union and endured mass
deportation to Central Asia under Stalin.  
A. ORIGINS OF RUSSIAN RULE
1. Early Conquest
The conflict between Russia and Chechnya began in the
eighteenth century when Peter the Great was pursuing
expansion of his empire.73 In his quest “to gain access to
the warm-water ports of the Black sea, link up with the
Christian kingdoms of Georgia and Armenia, and eventually
open up trade routes to the British Empire and India,”74
Peter the Great conquered the Chechen lands situated
geographically between Russia and its goals. Throughout the
remainder of the eighteenth century, the Russians with the
help of the Cossacks built military forts and settled the
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Chechen lands along the River Terek, “consolidating their
expansion into the new territory.”75
As the nineteenth century began, the northern Caucasus
region was experiencing a period of restless peace
continually interrupted by minor skirmishes between Russian
forces and the Chechens.76 The relative peace ended in 1816
with the appointment of General Alexei Yermolov as
Commander-in-Chief of the Caucasus.77 General Yermolov, a
hero of the Napoleonic Wars known for his extremely brutal
tactics, immediately commenced a campaign “aimed at ending
raids by the Mountaineers into Russian territory, and
bringing the khans and tribes of the region to a state of
full submission.”78 
Although Yermolov is generally credited with great
success on the battlefield, he did not “complete the
pacification of the Caucasus, and it may be argued that his
methods won Russia more bitter enemies than reliable
subjects.”79 After successfully putting down a full scale
rebellion in Chechnya (1825-6), Yermolov left the Caucasus
in 1827, beginning a period in which Chechens and other
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Following the previous decade of brutal Russian
conquest, the Chechens began a period of staunch resistance
to the Russian empire’s attempts to fully subjugate the
region. Robert Seely describes the situation as Yermolov’s
replacement, Prince Ivan Paskevich, was about to embark on
a new campaign in the Caucasus on the orders of Tsar
Nicholas:
When the 1830 campaign began in March, the
Russians found their enemy better prepared than
in previous years. Spurred on by the knowledge
that they would have either to accept Russian
rule or fight, proselytized Chechens, Avars, and
other mountain clans had agreed common cause in
1829 and elected a radical mullah, Mohammed, as
the first imam. He proved a competent military
leader and, in a series of military actions,
harrying the Russians from 1830 onwards, began to
experiment with the military tactics that other
leaders, most notably Shamil, would later use
against both the Russian armies and local clans
who accepted Russia’s stewardship.81
For the next thirty years, under the leadership of
Shamil, the “mountain people’s armed forces”82 conducted a
successful campaign of resistance using the guerrilla
tactics developed by Mohammed to inflict heavy casualties
on the larger Russian forces.83 During his thirty-year
campaign, Shamil used his popularity and power not only to
resist Russian conquest, but also to create a “mini-state
with its own tax and legal system” among the Chechens.84 In
managing his “mini-state,” Shamil maintained a standing and
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a reserve army, regulated prices for goods, and watched
over the public and private lives of his citizenry.85
In the late 1850s, Shamil’s campaign to resist the
Russians was in trouble. The Russians defeated the Turks
and Kars in the Crimean War (1854-6), bringing all hope of
Western and Ottoman help to an end. Furthermore, after
thirty years of war, Shamil’s followers, exhausted and
lacking the will to continue resistance efforts, abandoned
him.86 In 1859, completely surrounded by Russian troops,
Shamil surrendered. Although his surrender appeared to end
the resistance of the Chechen people to Russian rule,
Shamil’s efforts were not in vain. 
By the time of his surrender, Shamil was famous
across Europe. Karl Marx in his polemical works
attacking the Tsarist Empire called him a ‘great
democrat’ and exhorted the oppressed peoples of
Europe to emulate his courage. Historians have
argued that by laying down the first proper kind
of statehood in Chechnya and Dagestan, Shamil
actually made it easier for the Russians to
impose their authority, once they had conquered
these countries; but he also established a
precedent of self determination, which encouraged
the mountain peoples to continue resisting.87
B. CHECHNYA UNDER THE SOVIETS
Although the defeat and surrender of Shamil ended a
period of large-scale military resistance, it did not
completely extinguish the Chechen people’s will to resist.
As the twentieth century began, the Tsar found his empire
threatened from within by the Bolsheviks and other
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revolutionary movements. The democratic Provisional
Government that was established after the abdication of
Tsar Nicholas II seemed to be a fortunate turn of events
for the Chechens because the regime that had repressed them
for over a century was no longer in power.
The Bolshevik seizure of power from the Provisional
Government gave renewed hope for freedom to Chechens. The
following statement, “signed by Lenin and Stalin, to ‘All
Muslims, Toilers of Russia and the East’ on 3 December
1917” shows that Chechen hopes for freedom were founded in
the promises articulated by the Bolsheviks.88
Muslims of Russia! Tatars of the Volga and the
Crimea! Kyrgyz and Sarts of Siberia and of
Turkestan! Turks and Tatars of the Trans-
Caucasus! Chechens and mountain people of the
Caucasus! All you whose mosques and prayer houses
used to be destroyed, and whose beliefs and
customs were trodden under-foot by the Tsars and
oppressors of Russia! From today, your beliefs
and your customs and your national and cultural
constitutions, are free and inviolate. Organize
your national life freely and without hindrance.
You are entitled to this... Comrades! Brothers!
Let us march towards an honest and democratic
peace. On our banners is inscribed the freedom of
oppressed peoples.89
This hope was soon crushed by the discovery that the
Bolsheviks in fact intended to continue the conquest and
subjugation started by the Russian empire. The next thirty
years under the Soviet regime included uncertainty for the
Chechens over the status of autonomy for their region and
mass deportations by Stalin.




1. Chechen-Ingush Region: Status as an “Autonomous”
Republic in the Soviet Union
The overthrow of the Tsarist regime and the professed
support of the Bolsheviks for the freedom of the North
Caucasus peoples prompted the Chechens and Daghestanis in
May 1918 to “set up a North Caucasus Republic, recognized
by the Central Powers.”90 (The Central Powers consisted of
Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, Germany, and the Ottoman
Empire.) The recognition of the North Caucasus Republic by
the Central Powers was short lived because the Bolsheviks
soon began a campaign to re-assert colonial control over
the region, as Paul Henze writes,
through classic divide-and-rule techniques.
Peoples were allocated separate “autonomous”
republics and regions, areas of mixed populations
were shifted arbitrarily, and unrelated ethnic
groups with few common interests were joined
together so that each would serve to restrain
tendencies toward self-assertion among others.91
The ambiguity over the status of the region continued
as the Soviet government in 1921 again re-aligned the
region by setting up the Soviet Mountain Republic to
include Chechens, Ingush, Ossetes, Karachai, and Balkars,
with the Daghestanis organized separately.92 
In 1924, the Soviet Mountain Republic was again broken
up into separate autonomous regions. They remained
organized this way until 1936 when the Chechen-Ingush
region was upgraded to the status of an Autonomous Republic
within the Russian Federation instead of being elevated to
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the status of a full Union Republic.93 The importance of
this distinction would later play a role in Chechnya’s
struggle for self-determination. As Anatol Lieven explains,
Tragically, however, it [the Chechen-Ingush
region] became an Autonomous Republic and was
kept as part of the Russian Federation, rather
than being given status as a full Union Republic
like Azerbaijan and Georgia—something which would
probably not have prevented Russian interference
in Chechnya after 1991, but by avoiding the later
threat from the Chechens to ‘Russian territorial
integrity’ would almost certainly have avoided
the invasion and full-scale war which began three
years later.94
 The Chechens celebrated their new status and sent a
delegation of women from the Chechen-Ingush Republic to
Tblisi to thank Stalin’s mother for the “fatherly”
treatment of the Chechen-Ingush people.95 The celebration by
the Chechen people was premature. Stalin launched an NKVD
operation in the region in July 1937 to suppress “bandit”
operations, in which 14,000 Chechens and Ingush were
rounded up and shot. This initiated a new era of Soviet
tactics employed to control the region, mostly through
deportations, which began in February 1944.96 After the
Chechens returned from more than a decade in exile in 1957,
the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic was re-established
by the Soviet government.
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2. Deportations
A second factor contributing to the historical
distrust of the Chechens toward Russians is the massive
effort under the Soviet government to “liquidate” the
Chechen and Ingush peoples through deportation. In February
1944, the deportations began in earnest. Nearly 400,000
Chechens were sent to different parts of the Soviet Union.97
The deportations left deep mental scars in a new
generation of Chechens and made them even more distrustful
of the Russians. Although the Chechens had been praised for
their contribution to the war effort, the Soviet government
soon denounced the Chechens “as traitors and disloyal tools
of the Nazi invaders to justify uprooting them from lands
they had occupied for millennia.”98  
The inhumane manner in which the deportations were
conducted and the harsh conditions faced by the Chechens
remain etched in their minds today. Evidence of this can be
found in a first-hand account of the situation by Chechen
journalist Murad Nashkoyev:
In my cattle-truck, half of us died during the
journey. There was no toilet—we had to cut a hole
in the floor, and that was also how we got rid of
the corpses. I suppose we could have escaped that
way, but the men did not want to leave their
families. When we arrived in Kazakhstan, the
ground was frozen hard, and we thought we would
all die.99
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In November 1948, the Soviet government announced that
the deportations, which included nearly the entire
population of ethnic Chechens, were “permanent without
right of return.”100 The deported Chechens remained in exile
until Stalin’s death in 1953 and the subsequent easing of
restrictions on deportees. In his February 1956 “secret
speech,” Khrushchev denounced the policies of Stalin “which
had condemned the Northern Caucasus clans” to exile and
allowed the Chechens to return to their native lands.101
Upon their return to re-settle their native lands in
1957, the Chechen people found their villages either empty
or occupied by Russians who had moved in after the
deportations.102 The children among the deported Chechens,
some of whom are still alive, continue to bear the scars
inflicted by the brutality experienced during the period of
deportations that would later be described by Khrushchev as
“monstrous.”103
C. CHECHEN PERSPECTIVES
The mindset and determination of the Chechens to
continue resisting Russian rule, even when faced with
overwhelming odds, have been “tempered and hardened by the
historical experiences of the past two hundred years.”104
This defiance carries over to the most recent conflicts
involving Russia and Chechnya. Referring to the events
surrounding the Chechen declaration of independence in the
                    






autumn of 1991, Chechen historian Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov
said:
What is happening now in Chechen-Ingushetia is,
in my opinion, a revolt by the children in
revenge for the deaths of their fathers and
mothers in the hellish conditions of the
deportations in distant, cold and hungry
Kazakhstan and Kirgizia. It is a protest by the
whole people against the continuing supremacy of
the old power structures in Chechen-Ingushetia.105
Since 1991 the Chechen people have continued to rally
around their leaders, even when the leader’s popularity
among the people was low, in defiance of Russia’s attempts
to continue its domination. General Dzhokhar Dudayev is an
example of a leader with low popularity among the people
who was nonetheless supported instead of submitting to
Russian domination. Although elected by an overwhelming
majority106 to lead the Chechen drive for independence in
1991, Dudayev’s popularity among Chechens dropped
drastically as they began to view him as “someone to be
ashamed of, a tinpot Walter Mitty whose rantings...made the
Chechens seem a nation of criminals.”107 
Despite Dudayev’s waning popularity, the Chechen
people’s animosity toward Russia was much greater and would
ultimately cause them to rally around Dudayev rather than
accept Russian rule. On the eve of Russia’s 1994 military
invasion, the Chechens were faced with a choice: they could
accept Russian domination or they could rally around the
unpopular Dudayev. With the subsequent invasion, “Russia
                    




had achieved overnight what Dudayev had failed to do since
he took power in 1994—unite his small nation of armed,
trained fighting men against a common enemy.”
In the most recent conflict (from 1999 to the present)
the Chechens have continued to suffer numerous civilian
casualties, and some of the Chechen attitudes have become
more radical. In October 2002, a group of Chechen “freedom
fighters” stormed a theater in Moscow and held several
hundred people hostage. During the negotiations, Anna
Politkovskaya documented this exchange with Abubakar, the
deputy commander of the group responsible for the hostage
situation:
Politkovskaya: [referring to the way Abubakar
lives in the woods and mountains] Why do you live
like that?
Abubakar: I am a fighter for the freedom of my
country.
Politkovskaya: What did you come to Moscow for?
Abubakar: To show you what we feel like during
mop-up operations, when federals take us hostage,
beat us, humiliate, kill. We want you to go
through it and understand how you have hurt us.
Politkovskaya: But let the children go.
Abubakar: Children? You take our 12-year-old
children away. We are going to keep yours. To
make you understand what it feels like.108
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As the conflict continues, the Chechens are united in
their struggle to gain their freedom from Russian rule.
Their strength to continue resisting comes from the past
centuries’ memories of repression under the Tsarist Empire
and the Soviet Union. The Russian government continues to
represent its fight in Chechnya as a defensive suppression
of international terrorism and protection of the country’s
territorial integrity. The Chechens maintain that they are
continuing their centuries-old struggle for freedom. In
addressing the Commission on Security and Cooperation in
Europe on 3 November 1999 Lyoma Usmanov, Chechen
Representative to the United States, had this to say:
I would ask only that you understand how powerful
your example is to us. Over two hundred years
ago, in seeking redress for an inconsiderate
government’s ignorance of American aspirations,
your Declaration of Independence boldly
proclaimed, We hold these truths to be self-
evident, that all men are created equal, that
they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life,
Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness. We are
looking for life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness.... In this situation, we are forced to
defend our families and freedom. As your
president, Thomas Jefferson, said, “Resistance to
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IV. PROSPECTS FOR CHECHEN INDEPENDENCE AND RUSSIAN
NATIONAL INTERESTS
The purpose of this chapter is to examine prospects
for Chechen independence and to consider how an independent
Chechnya would affect Russian national interests in the
region. For Chechnya to gain its independence many
obstacles would need to be overcome by Chechens and
Russians alike. This chapter addresses the conditions
required for Chechen independence and examines the tension
between the principles of self-determination and
territorial integrity as they apply to the current Russo-
Chechen conflict. Solving the conflict would involve
striking a balance between Chechnya’s desire for self-
determination and Russia’s intention to protect what it
deems its territorial integrity and its security and
economic interests in the region. 
The current methods of attempting to resolve the
conflict (military combat and terrorism) have to date
proven to be unsuccessful for both antagonists. The failure
to achieve a military solution underscores the need to
examine the complex set of requirements and issues that
stand as an impediment to reaching a political solution
acceptable to both Chechens and Russians.
A. PROSPECTS FOR CHECHEN INDEPENDENCE
Russia and Chechnya, each with its own definition of
the present conflict, remain engaged in a battle that shows
little hope of any near-term resolution. Both sides
continue to seek resolution and/or retribution through the
use of violence, and both sides have to date failed to
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achieve their objectives. The obstacles to obtaining a
political solution to the conflict are numerous and
unlikely to be surmounted in the foreseeable future. 
For Chechnya to achieve independence, many conditions
would have to be met by the Chechens, the Russian
government and society, and foreign governments. These
conditions include significant support from foreign
governments, an erosion (or collapse) of prevailing foreign
perceptions of the legitimacy of Russian rule, the
development of Chechnya’s military power and political
cohesion, and the exhaustion of public support in Russia
for continuing repressive measures. Furthermore, in gaining
support for (or against) Chechen independence, the Chechens
and the Russians will need to convince foreign governments
to decide between the conflicting principles of territorial
integrity and self-determination as they apply to the
present conflict in Chechnya.
1. Conditions Required for Chechen Independence
The first of many conditions required for Chechnya to
gain independence is significant support from foreign
governments for its movement towards independence from
Russian rule. Although gaining such support is not
completely impossible, the recent use of terrorism as a
form of resistance by some groups110 within Chechnya has
undermined most of the possibilities for support from
foreign governments. The 11 September 2001 terrorist
attacks on the United States have allowed President Putin
to link his efforts to maintain Russian rule in Chechnya
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with the United States-led war on terrorism. As Gail
Lapidus points out:
In response to the events of September 11, and
out of deference to Russia’s participation in the
anti-terrorist coalition, the United States,
along with several European
governments,...expressed greater understanding of
the difficult problems Russia faces in the
region.... German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder
has suggested that the Chechen conflict should be
“re-evaluated.”111
The United States appears to have followed Chancellor
Schroeder’s advice. Washington has evidently “re-evaluated”
the Russian characterization of the conflict as a struggle
against international terrorism. Although the United States
has not condemned Chechnya and thrown its total support
behind Russia, the use of terrorism by some groups in
Chechnya has apparently swayed the United States position
in favor of Russia. In stating the United States policy on
Chechnya before the Commission on Security and Cooperation
in Europe on 9 May 2002, Steven Pifer, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, said:
We do not ask the Russian Government to try to
reach accord with terrorists. But we do believe
that there are those with whom discussions can be
undertaken, such as Mr. Mashkadov... At the same
time, we have called on Mr. Mashkadov and other
moderate Chechens to disassociate themselves with
terrorists.... A clear demonstration by Mr.
Mashkadov that he does not maintain such ties
[with terrorist elements in Chechnya] is
appropriate as a gesture to show that he is a 
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credible interlocutor for the Russians. And we
intend to continue to make that point to the
Chechens as well.112
The second condition required for Chechnya to gain
independence is an erosion (or collapse) of prevailing
foreign perceptions of the legitimacy of Russian rule. The
ability of the Chechens to sway the perceptions of foreign
governments and cast doubt on the legitimacy of continued
Russian domination of Chechnya has been crippled by the
terrorist acts of some groups purporting to be fighting for
Chechnya’s independence.113 By committing acts of terrorism
and allowing the region to become an enclave of
lawlessness, these groups are helping to solidify among
foreign governments support for the Russian government’s
position that it has the right to protect the country’s
territorial integrity.
After a meeting with President Putin on 11 November
2002, NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson expressed this
point in reference to Russia’s crackdown on Chechen
guerrillas: “Russia has a right to deal with breaches of
law and order on its own sovereign territory.”114 The United
States has indicated that it is committed to seeking “a
political settlement that will end the fighting, promote
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reconciliation, and recognize the territorial integrity of
the Russian Federation.”115
Another obstacle preventing Chechnya from making an
effective and winning case for independence is the
inability of its leadership to maintain control of the
Chechen population and territory. To gain control over the
population, Chechen leaders need to possess political
cohesion and to develop the Chechen nation’s military
power. In the absence of cohesive political and military
establishments, the leaders in Chechnya have little chance
of gaining support from foreign governments for Chechen
independence. In general, 
a government is entitled to recognition as the
government of a state when it may fairly be held
to enjoy, with a reasonable prospect of
permanency, the obedience of the mass of the
population and effective control of much the
greater part of the national territory.116
The concepts of political cohesion and military power,
although they may seem at first glance to be separate
issues, are in fact interdependent. The Mashkadov
government’s lack of political cohesion explains its
inability to control and unify the various armed groups
involved in the Chechen resistance. The armed fighters in
Chechnya have proven their prowess on the battlefield by
successfully engaging the Russian military with guerrilla
tactics. However, consolidation and control over that
military power constitute a problem for the Chechen
leaders. 
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To exercise control over its territory the Chechen
government needs to develop and control a conventional
military force. The various armed forces operating in
Chechnya are far from conventional in their organization
and orientation. The different groups operating in Chechnya
include the following:
• Group One consists of moderate and relatively
pro-Western supporters of the Mashkadov
government.
• Group Two comprises various armed groups
operating independently to achieve specific goals
such as protecting their villages and/or avenging
the deaths of friends and family members.
• Group Three includes radical elements supported
by and “oriented toward the Arab world and
promoting the Islamisation of Chechnya.”117
The three groups, although fighting for the same
cause, are not showing unity of effort to reach the common
goal of independence. This discord among the different
groups fighting for Chechen independence was noted by
Akhmed Zakayev, chief envoy of Chechnya’s separatist leader
Aslan Maskhadov, during an interview in December 2002:
In Chechnya every day, after every mopping-up
operation, autonomous groups that want to take
revenge are formed that are not under the control
of the general staff of the Chechen armed forces.
They are striking independently, as they wish,
and they are choosing their own methods of
retribution.118
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When the radicalized group uses terrorism, it has a
two-fold effect. First, with the United States-led war on
terrorism underway and most of the world’s nations
supporting it, Chechnya’s armed resistance to Russian rule
receives little favorable attention from foreign
governments. The second effect is that acts of terrorism
convey the impression that the Mashkadov government is not
able to effectively control its territory or military
forces. According to Colonel-General Yu Demin, Russia’s
Chief Military Procurator:
Mashkadov himself does not wield power on the
entire Republic’s territory. The power in the
Republic was usurped by various bandits, who call
themselves field commanders. They are staging
terrorist acts, taking hostages, and making
bandit attacks on the territory of neighboring
republics which are component parts of the
Russian Federation. And according to the Criminal
Code of the Chechen Republic of
Ichkeria...extremists such as Khattab, Basayev
and Rudayev should be outlawed and prosecuted.
But nobody is doing that. The terrorists feel at
home on the republic’s territory and are not only
not hiding, but are even declaring jointly with
Chechnya’s government structures their opposition
to federal troops.119
Another condition that is an important factor for
Chechnya to obtain independence is a breakdown of Russian
public support for the Russian military’s continued
operations in Chechnya. This point was not important during
the Soviet era, because public opinion was then almost
irrelevant to the formation of government policy. However,
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with the increase in public expressions of opinion since
1991, public opinion has become more important to Russian
leaders, and it may affect government decision-making.
In a recent poll conducted by the All-Russia Center
for the Study of Public Opinion, “49 percent of respondents
said Russian troops are not taking tough enough measures in
Chechnya; only 9 percent said the military was acting too
harshly.”120 President Putin’s popularity ratings remain
high, and this suggests public support for his decision to
act decisively in Chechnya. 
Although this information suggests a relatively high
level of public approval for Russian troops continuing
operations in Chechnya, a significant decline in public
support within Russia is not beyond the realm of
possibility. According to a poll conducted by the Russian
Center for Public Opinion and Market Research (VCIOM),
respondents believing that the military should continue
operations in Chechnya dropped from 70 percent in March
2000 to 46 percent in October 2002. Moreover, those
believing that Russia should enter into negotiations rose
from 22 percent to 45 percent during the same period.121
Indeed, a majority of the Russians polled responded to the
possible separation of Chechnya from Russia in one of three
ways: it has already happened (15 percent), respondent
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would be delighted by separation (25 percent), or it makes
no difference (15 percent).122
2. Territorial Integrity vs. Self-determination
Beyond the previously mentioned conditions, resolution
of the Russo-Chechen conflict will require foreign
governments to decide which principle is supreme:
territorial integrity or the right to self-determination.
The circumstances of particular cases have historically
determined how and when each principle is applicable. In
the Russo-Chechen conflict Russia maintains that it is
protecting its territorial integrity while Chechnya’s
position is that it is continuing a centuries-old fight for
national self-determination.
United States history offers examples of both
principles. The early leaders of the United States, in
declaring the country’s independence from the King of Great
Britain in 1776, said:
When in the Course of human events, it becomes
necessary for one people to dissolve the bands
which have connected them with another, and to
assume among the powers of the earth, the
separate and equal station to which the Laws of
Nature and of Nature’s God entitle them, a decent
respect to the opinions of mankind requires that
they should declare the causes which impel them
to the separation. We hold these truths to be
self-evident, that all men are created equal,
that they are endowed by their Creator with
certain unalienable Rights, that among these are
Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.—That
to secure these rights, Governments are
instituted among Men, deriving their just powers
from the consent of the governed, --That whenever
any Form of Government becomes destructive of 
                    
122 Ibid.
  48
these ends, it is the Right of the People to
alter or to abolish it, and to institute new
Government.123
In other words, the United States founders considered
their country’s self-determination more important than the
territorial integrity of the British Empire. Less than a
century after winning the battle for its independence, the
United States found itself embroiled in a civil war and on
the opposite side of the issue. The United States defended
its territorial integrity, and fought successfully to
prevent the Confederate states from seceding from the
Union.
Chechnya’s case for self-determination, setting aside
its leadership’s inability to effectively control its
territory and population, appears to be supported by
international norms as documented within the United Nations
Charter, resolutions, and declarations. In arguing for the
supremacy of self-determination over territorial integrity,
Ambassador Ashot Mekik-Shakhnazarian, Ministry of Foreign
Affair of Armenia, has made the following observation:
The people of a certain state decide on self-
determination and fight to that end—for which a
movement is often called separatist—and
subsequently the people make a spontaneous
declaration of what is as yet an unrecognised
republic. Frequently at this stage the movement
will be described as one of national liberation;
once the state is recognised by the world
community a new member of the world community
comes into being.... [I]t is worth mentioning
that the principle of self-determination—unlike
that of territorial integrity—is set down in a
                    





huge number of documents, from the UN Charter and
to a multiplicity of resolutions and declarations
by that organisation on the subject of the
granting of independence to colonies and
dependencies.... As for the principle of
territorial integrity, it should be recognised
that no such principle figures in either the
Charter or any other basic documents of the UN.124
In contrast, Russia argues that it has the right to
preserve and protect its territorial integrity. This
argument, like Chechnya’s argument for self-determination,
is well founded in state practice. In international history
there have been cases in which the right to self-
determination and the right to territorial integrity have
both been recognized and precedence has been given to
territorial integrity. Galina Starovoitova, a Russian
politician and analyst of international affairs, drew
attention to the following passages in United Nations
General Assembly Resolution 2625, adopted 1970:
[paragraph 5] The establishment of a sovereign
and independent State, the free association or
integration with an independent State, or the
emergence into any other political status freely
determined by a people constitute modes of
implementing the right of self-determination by
that people.
[paragraph 8] Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs
shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging
any action which would dismember or impair,
totally or in part, the territorial integrity or
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political unity of sovereign and independent
States conducting themselves in compliance with
the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples as described above and
thus possessed of a government representing the
whole people belonging to the territory without
distinction as to race, creed, or color.125
In deciding what position to take regarding the
dispute between Chechnya and Russia, foreign governments
need to determine which of the two conflicting principles
holds supremacy over the other. In doing so, they will be
deciding whether the Russian Federation’s representation of
the conflict holds more international legitimacy than the
representation by the Chechens. Martin Wight has suggested
that only international society as a whole can determine
international legitimacy:
Let us define international legitimacy as the
collective judgment of international society
about rightful membership of the family of
nations; how sovereignty may be transferred; how
state succession should be regulated, when large
states break up into smaller, or several states
combine into one.... We might draw the
provisional conclusion that it is only Powers
that are too weak to defend themselves whose
legitimacy is likely to be called into
question.126
If past performance is any indication of the future,
Russia and Chechnya should not expect foreign governments
to take the initiative in deciding which principle
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(territorial integrity or self-determination) has supremacy
when applied to the Russo-Chechen conflict. Ashot
Khurshudyan, Head of Training Unit, International Centre
for Human Development, highlighted other aspects of this
complex situation when he stressed
that both principles of territorial integrity and
self-determination are of high importance. But
before choosing one of these principles it is
essential also to look at the other criteria or
principles: justice and injustice, fairness and
unfairness, and other legal and moral principles,
otherwise the process of choosing a principle of
territorial integrity or self-determination will
be one-sided. While seeking to establish a long
lasting peace it is crucial to make sure that all
of these principles are balanced and satisfied.127
B. RUSSIAN NATIONAL INTERESTS
In an effort to gain international support for their
military actions in Chechnya, Russian leaders have argued
that they are combating international terrorism and
protecting the country’s territorial integrity. In a
broader context these goals translate to protecting Russian
national interests. Russian national interests as they
relate to the situation in Chechnya include security of and
within the Russian Federation’s borders. Russian national
interests also involve economic considerations related to
Chechnya’s geo-strategic location.
1. Security
Russia’s security concerns with regard to Chechnya
involve promoting peace and stability in the region and
preventing it from becoming an enclave for Islamic
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fundamentalism. The establishment of peace and stability in
Chechnya and the rest of the north Caucasus is a goal far
off in the future. However, a more achievable near-term
goal is to contain the lawlessness and terrorism which have
engulfed Chechnya and spread into Russia.
Russia addressed these threats in its national
security concept in 1999:
Terrorism in Russia has assumed a multi-planed
character and represents a serious threat to the
security of the state. An open campaign against
Russia to destabilise the situation in the North
Caucasus and tear this region away from Russia
has been unleashed by international terrorists
[there] and has created a direct threat to the
territorial integrity of the state.128
Although preventing the perpetuation of lawlessness
and terrorism in Chechnya is a matter of Russia’s internal
security, President Putin continues to portray it as part
of the greater global fight against international
terrorism: “If we do not fight the bandits [in Chechnya],
we will have them not only in Moscow, New York and
Washington, we will have them in many other countries of
the world.”129
Another issue concerning Russia and its security
involves the possibility of an independent Chechnya. The
radicalization of some elements of the independence
movement in Chechnya raises security concerns among Russian
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leaders. The primary concern is that Chechen independence
would lead to the creation of a radical Islamic enclave
which would “become a beach-head for further attacks on
Russia.”130 Chechnya’s independence would require Russia to
relinquish its authority to rule Chechen territory. This is
unacceptable to Russians who accept the argument advanced
in 1999 by Vladimir Putin, then Prime Minister: “the
terrorists will not stop at that. They will create an
extremist state that will continue to attack us.”131 A
further implication of the lawlessness and instability in
the region is that they are detrimental to economic
security.
2. Geo-Strategic Location of Chechnya and Economic
Concerns
Continued instability in Chechnya could have
disastrous affects on Russian economic interests in the
region. First, continued conflict and instability in
Chechnya prevent the influx of foreign investment needed to
develop and maintain the infrastructure required to exploit
the natural resources of the region. Conflict in a given
region repels investors because of the high risk of losing
their investments due to corruption and lawlessness. The
risks associated with Chechnya have been high, as Anatol
Lieven points out:
The presence of Chechnya across the existing
[oil] pipeline route from Baku to the Black Sea
has obviously been an impediment to Russian
hopes. Under Dudayev, the pipeline was riddled 
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with holes by local people siphoning off the
oil.... The war, of course, wrecked it still
further.132
Chechen independence would also have detrimental
financial implications for Russia because of Chechnya’s
geo-strategic location, “not that Chechnya is important in
itself, but that it lies on routes to much more important
places.”133 The utility of maintaining Chechnya as a part of
the Russian Federation resides in the transportation of oil
extracted from the Caspian Sea basin through Chechnya via
existing pipelines and prospective additional pipelines.
Anatol Lieven gives a further illustration of how Chechen
independence would affect Russian interests:
Today, the issue also remains lines of
communication; with Chechnya fully independent,
the geographical connections of Daghestan to the
Russian Federation would become thoroughly
eccentric. But even more important of course is
the fate of the oil pipeline from Azerbaijan
through Chechnya north to the Russian Port of
Novorossiisk, the rival to which is the plan for
a new pipeline through Georgia to Turkey. The
chief protagonists are the same as they were 150
years ago: Russia and Turkey... And seen from
Moscow, the ultimate issue is the same: hegemony
over the Caucasus.134
Resolving the conflict in Chechnya is a complex task
that will require a large amount of effort and cooperation
from Chechnya, Russia, and foreign governments. The
conditions required for Chechen independence are numerous
and complex. The only certain conclusion at this point in
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the conflict is that the current approach of using force to
solve the dispute is not working for either Russia or
Chechnya. The Russian claims that the conflict is “an
internal problem to be solved between the Chechen people
and the Russian Federation”135 are clearly not persuasive to
human rights monitors and some other foreign observers, and
at least some foreign governments may try to promote a
political solution to the conflict.
Legitimacy is derived from the collective opinions of
foreign governments. However, as Martin Wight points out:
Rules of legitimacy are necessarily very general,
and are elastic in proportion to their
generality. They can be applied to fit many
different and even contradictory circumstances.
Moreover, like all political principles, they are
guides not masters. There are occasions when it
is prudent to subordinate them to overriding
interests.... The most pronounced negative
criterion of international legitimacy at the
present time is the principle that conditions
brought about by military force or other means of
coercion should not be recognized. This derives
from the League Covenant, the Briand-Kellogg Pact
and the UN Charter.136 
The tension between self-determination and territorial
integrity continues. Foreign governments are unlikely, in
the near-term, to decide which antagonist in this conflict
has superior legitimate rights: self-determination in the
case of the Chechens or territorial integrity in the case
of the Russians. In the interim it seems that an enduring
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resolution to the conflict would require significant
compromises to address the needs of both parties.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
There is no short-term solution to the conflict over
Chechen aspirations to self-determination and independence.
Solving the conflict would require bold measures on both
sides to begin breaking down the barriers of mistrust that
have been created over the past centuries, and thereby
promote an environment of cooperation. 
To accomplish these ends each side would have to
acknowledge the other’s perspective on the history of the
conflict. Moreover, both sides would have to respect
accepted international norms, and be prepared to make
concessions. The antagonists do not yet appear ready,
however, to recognize that armed conflict and terrorism
have driven them into a quagmire, and that both sides would
have much to gain by working peacefully toward a political
solution.
The first step in solving the conflict may be for each
side to acknowledge the other’s historical perspective.
Russians must understand how centuries of Russian brutality
and domination have led the Chechens to mistrust them. The
dissolution of the Soviet Union rekindled independence
aspirations in Chechnya.
Chechens must also recognize that their use of
terrorist tactics during their struggle for independence
has provoked mistrust and disdain among Russians and
therefore has become an impediment to Chechnya’s quest for
independence. In 1999, professing to fear further collapse
of the government’s authority, President Putin declared
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that he needed to act in Chechnya. In describing the
situation after the violence in Dagestan he said:
I realized we needed to strike rebel bases in
Chechnya.... We would very soon be on the verge
of collapse.... This is what I thought of the
situation in August [1999], when the bandits
attacked Dagestan: If we don’t put an immediate
end to this, Russia will cease to exist. It was a
question of preventing the collapse of the
country.137
Although both sides have understandable reasons for
looking to history to justify their continued struggle, it
is important to address the historical basis of their ills
without becoming consumed by them. In the words of Dwight
D. Eisenhower, “Neither a wise man nor a brave man lies
down on the tracks of history to wait for the train of the
future to run over him.”138
The second requirement in moving toward a political
solution is for both antagonists to adhere to generally
accepted international norms and to discard unacceptable
practices (terrorism and the indiscriminate use of force
against civilian populations). Manvel Sargsyan, political
advisor to the President of Nagorno-Karabakh, explains the
risks associated with failure to act within international
norms:
The priority of the values of democratic
development in the approach to regional entities
must per se force these regional entities to
speak in the language of international norms. Any
regional entity which deviates from the norms
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indicated will quite simply find itself outside
the frame of international encouragement.139
In this regard, Chechnya’s priorities are clear. The
necessity to cut all ties with terrorist elements operating
in Chechnya or elsewhere is paramount. The use of terrorism
only serves to bolster the legitimacy of Moscow’s assertion
of control over Chechnya in the eyes of foreign
governments. 
For Russia, adherence to international norms would
mean that it would have to exercise restraint and focus its
efforts exclusively upon the terrorist elements. Russia’s
ability to effectively regain control of the region, stop
the armed conflict, and achieve a political solution
depends on bolstering the legitimacy of its rule among
Russians, Chechens, and foreign governments. In justifying
their actions in the current conflict, the Russians have
gone to considerable lengths to present a persuasive case
regarding the legality of their operations in Chechnya. The
exercise has been intended to persuade foreign governments
and observers within Russia that Moscow was doing “the
right thing” and that it was engaged in a “good” war.140
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140 Dr Steven J. Main wrote an extensive paper for the Conflict
Studies Research Center describing the legal justification for Russia’s
campaign in Chechnya. However, he points out that the main reason for
Russia’s extensive efforts to justify its actions was to assure the
public it was in the moral right as well as in the legal right. Steven
J. Main, “Counter–Terrorist Operation in Chechnya: On the Legality of
the Current Conflict,” in Anne Aldis, ed., The Second Chechen War
(Camberley, Surrey, England: Conflict Studies Research Center, June
2000), 28. Available at http://www.csrc.ac.uk/pdfs/P31-chap4.pdf

  60
 Regardless of whether Russia is successful in
convincing foreign and domestic observers that it is
engaged in a just conflict in Chechnya, Russian leaders
must determine if the cost of the conflict is worth the
effort required to continue the campaign. Regarding this
dilemma as it applies to the current conflict, Jakub
Swiecicki, a senior analyst at the Swedish Institute of
International Affairs, has this judgement:
It isn’t possible to be a victor in such a war.
But Putin seems not to understand that. It
exactly fits a comparison with France and Algeria
in the middle of the last century. Almost no
Frenchmen could imagine an independent Algeria.
But after several years, [then-French President
Charles] de Gaulle realized that the war harmed
France much more than anything else.141
Any political solution would require considerable
concessions from both the Russians and the Chechens. This
might require Chechnya to accept a less ambitious form of
self-determination, at least on a temporary and provisional
basis until confidence between Russia and Chechnya can be
established. This interim measure would require a large
amount of trust from the Chechens while Russian troops, in
cooperation with the Chechens, continued a campaign focused
on rooting out terrorist elements in Chechnya. Following
the elimination of terrorist elements and the restoration
of reasonable stability, Russian troops would need to
remain temporarily until Chechnya could develop its own
                    
141 Jakub Swiecicki quoted in Valentinas Mite, “Russia: Putin Vows
Harsher Measures in Chechnya – But Can He Win?,” (Radio Free




military and police forces under the control of an elected
government.
A period of relative peace and stability would allow
the Chechens the time and security environment required to
consolidate the local authorities, with the political
cohesion to control their own police and military forces
and provide security as well as law and order for the
people.
Clearly, any political solution that would end in
Chechen independence would also require addressing the
Russian security and economic concerns discussed in this
thesis.
The prospects for solving the conflict between Russia
and Chechnya over Chechen aspirations for independence and
self-determination without further violence appear remote
at present, but the possibility still remains. Overcoming
the mutual mistrust and contempt that have developed during
centuries of conflict and reprisal would be difficult.
However, overcoming this deep-rooted antagonism is
essential to resolving the conflict without more bloodshed
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